



RIGHTS AND POWERS OF MARRIED WOMEN,
IN PROPERTY HELD BY THEM SEPARATELY FROM THEIR HUSBANDS,
UNDER STATUTES, TRUST DEEDS, OR OTHERWISE.
This question recently came before the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island,' in a case not yet reported, under the following circum-
stances :
The Rhode Island statute2 on this subject, provides that "the
chattels real, &c., which are the property of any woman before mar--
riage, or may become the property of any woman after marriage,.
shall be, and are hereby, so far secured to her sole and separate use,
that the same, and the rents, profits and income thereof, shall not
be liable to be attached, or in any way taken, for the debts of the
husband, either before or after his death; and upon the death of
I The question is one of general interest, inasmuch as many States have the like
.egislation.
Public Laws of 1844, p. 270, secs. 1 and 2.
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the husband, in the lifetime of the wife, shall be and remain her
sole and separate property." * *
"The receipt or discharge of the husband" for the rents and
profits of such property, shall be a sufficient receipt and discharge
therefor, unless previous notice, in writing, shall be given by the
wife to the lessee, debtor, or incorporated company, from whom
such rents or profits are payable; in which case the sole and sepa-
rate receipt of the wife shall alone be a sufficient "receipt and
discharge therefor." * * And the act further provides that
such property "shall not be sold, leased or conveyed by the hus-
band, unless by deed, in which the wife shall join as grantor."
The wife held, under this statute, a leasehold estate, as tenant in
common, with another party, and wanted to have it partitioned,
but the proportions which each held were undefined by any deed or
other document. She applied to a chancery solicitor for this pur-
pose, and he advised a bill in equity, for the double purpose of
ascertaining her title and of setting off her share, in severalty,
which was held by the Supreme Court of New York' to be not only
a proper, but the only mode of obtaining these objects. She re-
tained the solicitor for this purpose, and herself promised to pay
him, but did pay him only a small part of his bill for services in
the long and laborious litigation which followed, the result of which
was a decree defining her title, and partitioning the estate between
the tenants. For the recovery of compensation for his services, he
filed a bill in equity against her, together with her husband, seeking
to establish a lien on her share of the property which had been the
subject of litigation, stating the retainer, the services, and the im-
portance of them to her interest in the estate, by which it was
greatly increased in value, that she had repeatedly promised to pay
for the services, by means of her share in the estate, and that, as
he had no other remedy, it was chargeable with the payment of the
amount, and praying a decree for a lien accordingly.
The defendants demurred to the bill, and it was heard in January,
1855, upon the bill and the demurrer, admitting the above state-
ments to be true.
The plaintiff contended for the general proposition that, where a
' Green vs. Putnam, 1 Barb. S. C. 508.
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sze"vice has beefi rendered, or expenditures have been made, at the
request of a married woman, upon, or in reference to her separate
estate, which were beneficial to said estate, that estate is chargeable
with compensation for them,-and cited the following authorities:
Muhrray vs. Barlee, 4 Sim. R. 82, before the Vice Chancellor,
who held that where a married woman, having separate property,
and living apart from her husband, employed the plaintiffs as her
solicitors, and promised them by letter, that she would pay their
bills, but did not refer to her separate property, that#that property
was liable to pay the bills. This decision was confirmed on appeal
to the Lord Chancellor, 3 M. & K. 209, who said, "Kothing could
more effectually defeat the purposes of marriage settlements, than
denying power to the wife thus to charge her estate. She is meant
to be protected by the separate provisions, from all oppression and
circumvention, and to be made independent of her husband, as well
as all others. If she cannot obtain professional aid, and that with
the facility which other parties find in obtaining it, she is not on
equal terms with them. If the husband or the trustees can hold her at
arm's length, and refuse her the proceeds of the fund held by them
for her use, and if they can engage a solicitor, while she can only
obtain such help by executing a mortgage, or by granting bonds or
notes, she is not on the same footing with them," &c.
So, in Yorth American Coal company vs. D~yott, 7 Paige, 14,
Chancellor *Valworth held, The feme covert is, as to her separate
estate, considered as a feme sole, aid may, in person, or by her
legally authorized agent, bind such separate estate with the pay-
ment of debts contracted for the benefit of that estate, or for her
own benefit, upon the credit of the separate estate. And even the
assent or concurrence of the trustee is not necessary, where no re-
striction upon her power is contained in the deed or instrument
under which such separate estate is held, citing Dowling vs. Ma-
gntire. 1 Floyd & Gould's Rep. Temp. Plunkett, 19; Cater vs. Eve-
leigh, 4 Dessau. 19; 3lontgometry vs. Eeleigh, 1 McCord's Oh.
Rep. 267; J. A. Co'il Co. vs. Dyott, 7 Paige R. 9, 14, which was
affirmed by the Court of Errorz, in 20 Wendell, 570. And the
same Chanceller rciterait,l the sanime doctrine in Gardner vs.
Gardner, 7 Paige, 112.
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The Vice Chancellor, in 1 Sandf. Ch. 25, held the same doc-
trine as prevailing before the revised statutes. Also, in the impor-
tant case of Curtis vs. .Egell, 2 Sandf. Ch. 287-8, the same doc-
trine was held. And again in ANoyes vs. Blakeman, 3 Sanf. S. C.,
531, it was held by the Superior Court that the solicitor and coun-
sel who defended suits brought to charge the separate estate of a
married woman with her insolvent husband's debts, was held enti-
tled to recover such expenses against the estate which he had de-
fended, on the retainer and agreement of the trustee to compen-
sate him out of the rents and profits.
The plaintiff's counsel next cited Jacques vs. Methodist -Episcopal
Church, 17 Johns. 548, in which Ch. J. Spencer held, that the deci-
sions fully established that a fene covert, with respect to her sepa-
rate estate, is to be regarded in a court of equity as a feme sole,
and may dispose of her property with the consent or concurrence
of her trustee, unless she is specifically restrained by the instrument
under which she acquires her separate estate; and that the estab-
lished rule in equity is, that when a feme covert, having separate
property, enters into an agreement, and sufficiently indicates her
intention to affect by it her separate estate, a court of equity will
apply it to the satisfaction of such an engagement.
In fine, it is said in 1 White & Tudor's Leading Cases in Equity, 370,
65 Law Library, 374, relying upon the above cited New York cases
that the rule laid down in the Court of Chancery has been, that
the wife's separate estate is liable in equity for any debts, contracted
by hersef or her agent, for the benefit of that estate, or for her own
benefit upon the credit of her separate estate. Other important cases
are quoted in 1 White & Tudor, 370 to 376, and were cited by
both parties in this ease. The last case cited by plaintiff was a passage
from Reid vs. Zamas, 1 Strobb. at p. 40, which approves the
decision in Murray vs. Barlee, above cited. He also referred to
Adams' Eq. 159, 2 Stor. Eq. Jur. § 1397, and note 2, § 1400, and
note 1, and § 1401.
The defendant's counsel insisted that a married woman cannot
bind her separate property at all, in any case, nor can her creditors
reach it, under her contracts or otherwise, except according to the
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express provisions of the trust deed, statute or other instrument
under which the property is held.
He cited Jaques vs. Methodist -piscopal Church, from 3 Johns.
Ch. J. 77, which was overruled by the Court of Errors, per Spencer,
Ch. J., as above. Also, Beid vs. Zamae, 1 Strobb, 27, which
shows that the South Carolina doctrine is strong in his favor, and
1 White & Tudor, 361, 370, et seq. But his chief reliance was
upon the R.I. statute above quoted, and the case of letcalfvs. _ook,
2 Rhode Island Reports, 355, which held that where property is
put in trust for the separate use of a married woman, she has no
power to charge or dispose of the same except as expressly provided
in the instrument creating the trust.
Judge Hale, who gave the opinion of the court in that case, said:
The rights, liabilities, power and control of married women over
their separate property are well establiahed 'and defined in this State
by positive statute and by the rules of the common law. And a
feme covert here, is not deemed in relation to her contracts, as in
some cases in England, a feme sole. But her right and power to
bind herself or her separate property must depend in each case
upon our statutes, the rules of the common law, or upon some legal
instrument creating such right and power.
The court sustained the demurrer, and in concisely giving their
opinion, (not written out,) said they considered the above case,
decided by themselves, as substantially sustaining the defendant's
ground; and furthermore, that under the R. I. statute, the husband
has full control of the rents of the wife's separate property, until
prohibited by the notice pointed out by it, which has not been given
in this case, and, of course, the husband's power to receive the rents
still remains, nor had the wife, in this case, made any appropriation
of the rents nor conveyance of the property to pay for the plaintiff's
services, which they acknowledged were meritorious, and they were
strongly inclined to aid him, if they had the power, which they
considered was denied them by the statute, under which the pro-
perty was held.
NOTE.-A strong case on this subject was very recently decided by the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, sitting in Equity, Ilayes vs. Perkins, et a], briefly reported,
jinfra.
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The late James Perkins, of Boston, bequeathed to his widow the clear sum of
$6,000 annually, payable quarter-yearly. She afterwards married the Rev. Dr.
Doane, now Episcopal Bishop of New Jersey. This gentleman having failed in
business, and being much embarrassed, a contract was made between himself, Mrs.
Doane and Michael Hayes of New Jersey, by which it was agreed that Hayes should
take up certain notes to a large amount, which he had endorsed for the Bishop's
accommodation, and that Mrs. Doane should give him an order on her trustees in
Boston to pay him $1,000 annually for a certain number of years, until he should
receive one-half of what he had advanced. Hayes proceeded to take up and pay
the notes, and Mrs. Doane gave him the order requesting the trustees to pay him
$1,000 a year, as had been agreed.
The first yearly payment was made by Bishop Doane. When the second became
due, Hayes demanded it of the trustees, (Thos. H. Perkins and others,) who
had doubts whether they ought to pay it; and as E. N. Perkins, son of Mrs. Doane,
'presented an order of a subsequent date forthe quarterly payment, $1,500 then due,
(which order was in favor of Bishop Doane and by him endorsed,) the trustees
filed a bill in equity, asking the instructions of the court. The case was argued
by C. G. Ripley for the trustees, J. L. English for E. N. Perkins, and P. W. Chand-
ler and S. G. Wheeler for Hayes. Judge Thomas delivered the opinion of the court
holding that the legacy to Mrs. Doane was intended for her support, and was to be
payable quarter-yearly, and that she had no right to make such a contract as she
did make with Hayes, although with the consent and for the benefit of her-husband,
and that the same was void in law. The order in favor of E. N. Perkins, being a
quarterly payment then due, was a valid one.
The judge said (we quote from the report of the Daily Advertiser):
"The Court have not found it necessary to examine the question how far a fem6
covert has the power of a fenze sole over her separate estate, because we think the
contract defeats the will. It is clear that the yearly legacy of $6,000 was devised to
the devisee for the use of herself and her children during the minority; and that it
-was payable to her own order, subject to limitations which might arise in certain
contingencies. Power to alienate by anticipation is not given by the terms of the
will: and though powers may sometimes be implied for the purpose of promothig
the intention of the testator, they will never be implied for defeating it. Opinitwn ,.
the Court adverse to the validity of the contract."
